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Abstract
We introduce a novel rule-based approach to at-
titude prediction based on sentiment implicatures.
It is based on a verb lexicon specifying so-called
polarity frames where the semantic roles of the
verb might cast positive or negative polar effects on
the argument fillers. Verbs that subcategorize for
clausal complements are further classified accord-
ing to their signature, i.e., whether they assert fac-
tuality on the subclause. An empirical evaluation
revealed that (naive) human annotators determine
polar effects rather selectively. This is in contrast
to the rigorous behaviour of our current rules. This
raises the need for a more sophisticated theory of
attitude prediction.
1 Introduction
Recently, attitude prediction has raised some interest in the
field of sentiment analysis (e.g. [Deng and Wiebe, 2015]). It
strives to determine what the overt or (more interesting) hid-
den attitudes among the participants of a given sentence are.
Verbs seems to be crucial here. For instance, a verb might cast
a positive or negative effect on its direct object as in ”A helps
B”. It is good for B to be supported. But is this true in any
case and what kind of positive effect is it: is it intrinsically or
extrinsically good. Given the polar effects of a verb, the atti-
tudes among the participants can be captured with rules like:
if A is (lets say) the actor of a situation described by a verb
that casts a positive effect on its (lets say) theme B, then A is
positive towards B. If A and B are humans or organisations
etc. we would say that they are proponents. More compli-
cated cases arise if we consider subclause embeddings as in
”C criticizes that A helps B”. Now, A is still a proponent of
B, but what about C? Obviously, C is against A and B. Again,
we need to know that ”criticize” casts a negative effect on its
clausal complement, and we need general rules that tell us
that an agent C is an opponent of an agent B if C is against a
situation (help) that casts a positive effect on B. Similarily, C
is an opponent of an agent A who is in charge of the positive
effect on B.
Can we infer anything if negation is present: C has not
criticized that A has not helped B? This is no longer only a
semantic question, but a pragmatic one as well. It could be
the case that the writer of such a sentence simply negates that
such an event has taken place at all. Then nothing follows, it
is a kind of denial that happens: C might have been unaware
of any situation where B has needed help that A was not able
or willing to give. But if the sentence is meant as a reproach,
namely that C should have criticized (“that ..”), then again
attitudes become apparent. First of all, the writer is against C
(and A) and pro B. C, on the other hand, must be somehow
against B, because a negative effect on B was not worth a
(negative) comment in the eyes of C. What about C and A?
Is C an proponent a A (well, he has not criticized the omision
of help of A)? In a sense, C is pro A, but not actively, more
implicitely. But is this a safe inference, do humans agree on
it?
In this paper, we introduce a rule-based model for German
able to draw these kind of inferences. Our model not only pre-
dicts attitudes, but also determines who benefits (or suffers)
from the situation described by a sentence. This is in contrast
to existing work which only deals with attitudes. Moreover,
our approach is the first one that takes factuality into account.
Factuality is crucial for a certain kind of inferences. The con-
dition under with factuality can be infered are verb-specific
and depend on the affirmative status of the sentences.
In an empirical evaluation, we found that humans do not
agree to the extent we expected and, thus, system perfor-
mance was difficult to evaluate. In this paper, we discuss the
reason for this and its implications.
2 Verb Polarity Frames
A verb polarity frame is a subcategorization frame of a verb
where some verb roles cast polar effects given that a sentence
with the verb is factual and affirmative (not negated). If A
criticizes B, this is negative for B. If A wins the competition,
this is positive for A, and finally, if A hurts B, this is neg-
ative of A and negative for B. These effects are associated
with argument positions of the verb frame. We distinguish
a1, a2, a3 and a4, capturing the (logical) subject, the object
(direct and indirect), the prepositional complement and the
subclause, respectively. The logical subject of a verb instance
might be given by the direct object of the matrix clause it is
embedded in (if the matrix verb is an object control verb),
we thus prefer to talk of argument positions instead of gram-
matical roles. Note that in our current model “(The famous)
Bocuse cooks” and “The rice cooks” would have the same
argument structure. Selectional restrictions make the differ-
ence here. Also verb ambiguity is something that needs to
be coped with outside our model (e.g. in the preprocessing
phase).
In order to motivate a further distinction, let us have a look
at a candidate for a general inference rule. Given that A crit-
icizes that B injures C. If A disapproves (here “criticize”) an
event (injury) that is negative for C, then we are inclined to
believe that A is a proponent of C, we say, A is pro C. Also,
if B is the agent of that event, then probably he is an oppo-
nent of A, we say: A is con B. It turns out that the distinction
between of-roles and for-roles is helpful for specifying gen-
eral inference rules. Instead of assigning positive or negative
effects to a verb argument, we specify whether it is a positive
or negative of-role or for-role. Table 1 shows three frames of
the verb “to criticize”.
Role F1 P1 F2 P2 F3 P3
r1 a1 of a1 of a1 of
r2 a2 nfor a2 nfor a4 neff
r3 a4 neff - - - -
Table 1: Frames of “to criticize”
Frame F1 comprises three roles, r1 to r3 (A criticizes B for
C). Role r3 is realized as a4, e.g. a clause level argument in
the form of a gerund. We distinguish the following polarity
roles (P): pfor, nfor, pof, nof capturing positive and negative
for- and of-roles (of and for denote neutral cases). Clause
level effects are specified as negative (neff) or positive (peff).
Polarity roles like pfor are generalizations, e.g. a1 and a2 can
both realize an for-role given particular verbs.
To summarize, verbs are characterized by their arguments
ai. Different syntatic constellations might give rise to the
instantiation of a particular ai (passive voice, control verbs,
etc.). Within a frame, an ai is associated with a polarity role
(pfor, etc.). Inference rules rely on the status of an argument
as a polarity role, independent of the concrete argument type
(e.g. a1 or a2).
The current German verb lexicon comprises 330 different
verbs resulting in 680 polarity frames. About 80 verbs sub-
categorize for a complement clause. Although the model is
for German, all examples are given in English.
3 The Role of Factuality
A major claim of this paper is that factuality plays a crucial
role in the determination of attitudes and also for polar effects
posed by particular verbs. Consider for illustration the sim-
ple case of a positive effect that the subject receives given the
sentence The president wins the election. Various approaches
from the literature rather focus on the attitudes between the
participants or even those of the author of a text towards the
participants (e.g. [Deng and Wiebe, 2014]). They do not
care for factuality. But in these scenarios, factuality plays a
role, although not in each and every constellation. Attitudes
that stem from intra-clausal dependencies require factuality.
For instance, in The president criticizes the minister a neg-
ative attitude of the president towards the minister holds if
the sentence is factual. If the sentence is embedded in a verb
casting non-factuality like to hope, this no longer is true (cf.
The vice president hopes that the president criticizes the min-
ister). This sentence, however, also shows that predictions
between an actor of a (factual) matrix clause and those of a
(non-factual) subclause are possible. Here the vice president
has negative attitude towards the minister although the sub-
clause is non-factual. Factuality is crucial, but there are also
constellations, where it neither licenses nor prevents attitude
predictions.
4 Verb Signatures
Verbs that subcategorize for a clausal complement are further
specified for (non-)factuality of the clausal complement. Fac-
tuality means that the situation described in the subclause is
meant (by the writer) to be true (to hold). We follow the work
of [Karttunen, 2012] who distinguishes factive, non-factive
and implicative verbs. Factuality of the subclause depends on
the matrix verb signature and the presence or absence of nega-
tion in the matrix clause. Factive verbs such as “to regret” cast
factuality on their subclause, irrespective of whether the main
clause is negated or not. If A regrets that COMP, then COMP
(the subclause) is true in the sense that the speaker believes
(or a least asserts) COMP to be true. The same holds for A
does NOT regret that COMP (factuality here is constant under
negation, thus factuality is a presuppositon of factive verbs).
Note that factive verbs need not to be factual in order to cast
factuality. If A hopes that B regrets (non-factual) to bother C,
then the bothering event is factual. Sublcauses of non-factive
verbs, on the other hand, are never meant to be true (e.g. ”to
pretend”, ”to hope”).
Then there are verbs called implicatives that cast a mixture
of factuality and non-factuality. Two-way implicatives like
”to forget to” have non-factual subclauses in an affirmative
(not negated) use, but factual subclauses if negated. One-way
implicatives only give rise to factuality in either the affirma-
tive (like ”to force”) or negated matrix verb contexts (like ”to
refuse”). For instance, if A forces B to lie, B lies. If A does
not force B to lie, then B might lie as well, we just cannot tell.
Table 2 summarizes the signatures, introduces the concept la-
bels (e.g. AF) we use to represent them and gives example
verbs.
label explanation matrix verb
F factual in any case to regret
NF non-factual in any case to hope
AF factual, if affirmative to force
ANF non-factual, if affirmative to forget
NaF factual, if non-affirmative to forget
NaNF non-factual, if non-affirmative to manage
NaO true or false, if non-affirmative to help
Table 2: (Non-)Factuality of Subclauses
We found this information to be crucial for inferences.
Non-factuality blocks some, but not all inferences. Take: “A
hopes that B wins”. The subclause is non-factual, so B does
not receive a positive effect (he is not a beneficiary): this in-
ference is blocked. However, the attitude of the of-role bearer
of the (factual) matrix sentence (A) towards the bearer of the
for-role (B) of the (non-factual) embedded verb still holds (a
positive relationship): it is not blocked.
Relationship inferences within a non-factual clause, how-
ever, are blocked. For instance, if A hopes that B loves C, the
inference that B has a positive attitude towards C is blocked.
of for sc-eff aff neg
to criticize of - neff AF NaF
to approve of - peff AF NaF
to help pof - peff AF NaO
to help pof pfor -
to injure nof nfor -
to survive - pfor -
Table 3: Polarity Frames
In Table 3 we give the polarity frames including signatures
of some verbs. A hyphen indicates that the role is not part
of the verb frame in question, column sc-eff means subclause
effect. The last two columns relate to the verb signatures as
introduced in Table 2, the penultimate column reports the re-
striction if the matrix verb is aff(irmative) and the last column
if it is neg(ated). For example, the subclause of “to help” (line
3) is factual if the help sentence is affirmative (AF), but its
truth value is unspecified (NaO) if negated.
5 Rule-based Sentiment Inference
Our rule-based approach is realized in Prolog, the rule inter-
preter is implemented as a meta interpreter. Starting from
predicate argument structures, the algorithm determines fac-
tuality from outside-in (from the matrix verb to the innermost
verb), then at the innermost level all rules are applied. The
algorithm keeps doing this (rule application) at each recur-
sion level gathering all the assertions so far derived until the
outermost level is reached (again).
The syntax of the rules we propose is quite simple. We
use the Prolog notation here, since all rules are basic horn
clauses with equivalents in predicate logic. The only nota-
tional convention to mention is that the head of such a rule
comes first, separated from the body by “:-” (the implication
operator turned to its left←). Variables are written in caps, a
comma (,) means conjunction, a semicolon (;) indicates dis-
junction, \+ means negation (as failure). Take the follow-
ing definition of beneficiary: a beneficiary X is someone who
takes the pfor role in an affirmative and factual sentence I:
b1 beneficiary(X,I):- fact(I),aff(I),pfor(I,X).
The equivalent predicate logic formula is:
∀I,X: pfor(I,X)∧ aff(I)∧ fact(I)→ beneficiary(X,I)
In order to introduce our scheme, we go through the fol-
lowing (hypothetical) sentence, the input structures are given
in Table 4.
S: The minister has criticized that the EU has helped Greece
to survive.
These instantiations are based on the polarity frames of
the verbs and the dependency tree of the sentence. Since
no negation is present, it holds that aff(criticize), aff(help),
# input predicates
1 of-role(criticize,minister) neff(criticize,help)
2 pof(help,EU) pfor(help,Greece)
3 peff(help,survive) pfor(survive,Greece)
4 aff(criticize) aff(help)
5 aff(survive) fact(criticize)
Table 4: Input Representation
aff(survive) (line 4 and 5), where aff means affirmative use.
The matrix clause (since no modal is present) is factual (line
5), i.e., fact(criticize). Note that pfor(help,Greece) just means
that Greece occupies a particular polar role. Whether Greece
actually gets a positive effect depends on the factuality as de-
termined by the matrix verb and its affirmative status (and
also the affirmative status of the complement verb itself).
The factuality of complement clause I is determined by the
following rules (and based an the verb signatures, the predi-
cate is vsig(Verb,Signature)):
f1 fact(I) :-
eff_role(MCI,I),vsig(MCI,AF),aff(MCI).
f2 fact(I) :-
eff_role(MCI,I),vsig(MCI,NaF),\+aff(MCI).
f3 fact(I) :- eff_role(MCI,I),vsig(MCI,F).
where:
eff_role(MCI,I):- neff(MCI,I);peff(MCI,I).
A sentence I (I is the finite verb) is factual if it is embedded
into a matrix verb MCI and MCI is affirmative and has verb
signature AF (asserted factual), if it in negated (\+aff) and
bears signature NaF (not asserted factual) or if it is a factive
verb (f3). A factive verb like “regret” casts factuality inde-
pendent of its own factuality status: If A hopes that B regrets
(non-factual) to bother C, then the bothering event is factual.
If A hopes that B helps (non-factual) C to survive, although
“help” is asserted and is of type AF (i.e. casts factuality if
asserted), in the context of “hope” (a ANF) this is blocked:
the survive event is non-factual.
Since eff role(criticize,help), vsig(criticize,AF) and
aff(criticize) satisfy f1, it follows that fact(help). Similarily,
fact(survive) can be derived. Now can see that Greece is a
beneficiary (see the definition b1 of beneficiary) since (as
derived by f1) fact(help) and (from Table 4) aff(help) and
pfor(Greece, help), which gives i1 from Table 5.
Before reading the further outline of our rule component,
the reader is invited to verify that the following inferences
drawn from the example sentence S are in line with his/her
intuition (i4 and i6 needs further explanation, though):
# inference rule
i1 beneficiary(Greece) b1
i2 pro(EU,Greece) r1
i3 con(minister,EU) r2
i4 disapprove(minister,survive) r3
i5 con(minister,Greece) r4
i6 con(EU,minister) r6
Table 5: Inferences
We now introduce the rules needed to understand our ex-
ample. The main goal is to find out, whether A is for B, which
we model with the property pro; or whether A is against B,
here con is used. A verb might (directly) reveal the relation
between the participants within the same clause: if A helps
B, then A is pro B. If A criticizes B, then A is con(tra) B
(at least in a certain - the given - context, not necessarily in
a fundamental, irreconcilable way). Provided, of course, the
situation is factual.
r1 pro(X,Y) :-
of_role(I,X),fact(I),aff(I),pfor(I,Y).
where: of_role(I,X) :- pof(I,X);nof(I,X).
Rule r1 states: An actor X (the of-role) is pro Y if in a
single factual, affirmative sentence I, Y is the filler of the pfor
role (i2 from Table 5 follows): pof(EU,Greece).
If a sentence I embeds a sentence I2, then rules like the
following are in charge:
r2 con(X,Y) :- aff(I),fact(I),neff(I,I2),
aff(I2),of_role(I,X),of_role(I2,Y).
According to r2, an affirmative and factual matrix clause
I that embeds an affirmative sublause I2 (factuality of I2 is
irrelevant) bearing a negative effect ( neff) gives rise to a con
relation between the of-role of the matrix clause and the of-
role of the subclause (see i3 from Table 5): con(minister, EU).
More complicated scenarios arise in the case of multiple
embeddings. According to Table 3, ”to criticize” has a neff
role while ”to help” has a peff role. If someone A criticizes
that someone B helps somebody C to achieve something D
(D=survive), then, obviously, A disapproves with D. That is,
a neff on a peff gives disapprove, see rule r3.
r3 disapprove(X,I3) :-
neff(I,I2),peff(I2,I3),
aff(I),fact(I),aff(I2),of_role(I,X).
The matrix clause must be factual: if A (just) might criticize
that COMP, nothing can be inferred about A’s (dis-)approval
regarding COMP (and COMP of COMP). Rule r3 triggers
and produces i4 from Table 5:disapprove(minister,survive).
The next rule describes how disapprove propagates to a con
relation (factuality is irrelevant here).
r4 con(X,Y) :-
disapprove(X,I),aff(I),pfor(I,Y).
If someone disapproves an affirmative situation that is posi-
tive (pfor) for someone, then he is against this person. Rule
r4 produces i5 from Table 5: con(minister,Greece).
Another way to come to the same conclusion (i5) is to com-
bine pro and con relations. If A is con B and B is pro C then
A is con C (rule r5):
r5 con(X,Z) :- con(X,Y),pro(X,Z).
r6 con(X,Y) :- pro(X,Z),con(Y,Z).
There are some cases which we cannot describe using
con/pro inferences but only with intermediate (dis-)approve
derivations. There are also inferences that need con/pro. If,
for instance, A is pro B and C is con B then we might be al-
lowed to guess that A is con B. In our example it follows EU
con minister (rule r6), see i6 from Table 5. Note that these
transitively given pro and con relations must not be taken too
fundamentally. If (rule r6) A admires B while C finds B bor-
ing, both, A and C are opponents, but only conditional on
B, so to speak. In general, pros and cons can only deliver
situation-specific attitudes.
6 A Corpus for Sentiment Inference
No German gold standard exists for our inference task. We
thus have started to create such a corpus. Before starting a
more ambitious initiative with real sentences, we first wanted
to explore how our model performs given rather complicated
sentences. However, a small number of real sentences were
considered as well. We started with 100 made-up (corpus F)
and 40 real sentences (corpus R). Corpus F, the constructed
sentence corpus, is meant to represent the phenomena we
are dealing with in a very condensed way. That is we cre-
ated complex sentences with up to four levels of embedding,
where each subclause covers a verb from our lexicon. We also
created versions of some of the sentences where negation is
distributed over all (sub)clauses exhaustively according to the
possible permutations. In order to avoid a bias towards verb-
specific phenomena, 50 different verbs were used.
Another question is whether we can clearly define the task
we intend to solve. What are the annotation guidelines? Our
two annotators are given the following instructions: Take the
sentence to be true, then
• for all pairs of entities from the sentence, determine
whether there is an attitude of one entity towards the
other entity (and vice versa) - and whether it is positive
or negative.
• for all entities from the sentence, determine whether
this entity can be seen as benefitting or suffering (in the
broadest sense) from the situation described.
We also told them that the attitudes in question are to be un-
derstood as situation-specific and need not necessarily hold
in general. We deliberately avoided to give them any back-
ground information concerning our model and the details of
our verb resource.
The other 40 sentences, corpus B, were taken randomly
from the DeWac corpus [Baroni et al., 2009]. Again, only
sentences were considered where at least two verbs from our
lexicon are forming a complex clause.
7 Evaluation
The output of the annotation efforts in terms of the confusion
matrices was a bit of a surprise. We expected a higher agree-
ment, since we thought the task at hand was straightforward
and the annotation guidelines were precise. However, the an-
notation task of the sometimes rather complex constructions
does not seem to be that simple. The task was to annotate
pro, con, sufferer and beneficiary cases. Table 6 shows the
confusion matrix of the pro/con annotation (annotator A and
B).
We can see that the main problem is the none class, where
one annotator has chosen to annotate a relation while the
B B B
pro con none
A pro 42 3 16 61
A con 1 126 28 155
A none 13 37 0 50
56 166 44 266
Table 6: Confusion Matrix: pro and con
other one did not. For instance, there are 37 cases where an-
notator B thought a con relation should hold, while annotator
A did not.
The situation is similar with beneficiary/sufferer classifica-
tions (see Table 7).
B B B
benef. sufferer none
A benef. 30 1 11 42
A sufferer 2 57 36 95
A none 4 17 0 21
36 75 47 158
Table 7: Confusion Matrix: benef. and sufferer
These results show that the task is more difficult than ex-
pected. We have avoided to train the annotators exhaustively
in advance since we wanted the results to be free of any deci-
sions stemming from model-conform considerations.
We compared the output of our system with the annotations
produced by the two annotators. Although we have a running
pipeline, in this study, the system was provided with perfect
predicate argument structures to enable a fair comparison of
the performance of the rules to human performance (since
humans are not impaired by noisy syntactic structures).
If we take the annotations of A as gold (see Table 8 and 9),
then the precision of our system for pro and con detection is
58% while recall is 63%. If we evaluate annotator B against
annotator A taken as gold, precision is 77% and recall 78%.
System System System
pro con none
A pro 39 4 19 62
A con 7 101 53 161
A none 47 43 0 90
93 148 72 313
Table 8: Confusion Matrix: Annotator vs System
For the detection of beneficiariy and sufferer, precision is
64% and recall 76% (see Table 9). If we evaluate annotator B
against A taken as gold, precision is 81% and recall 64%.
The overall picture is not very clear. While the f-measure
for pro/con 77.5% (B) versus 60.4% (system) makes a big dif-
ference, the one for sufferer/benef., 71.2% (B) versus 69.5%
(system), does not. System performance is behind human
agreement, which is on the other hand is far from being per-
fect.
System System System
benef. sufferer none
A benef. 35 0 7 42
A sufferer 2 72 24 98
A none 10 50 0 60
47 122 31 200
Table 9: Confusion Matrix: Annotator vs System
8 Error Analysis
There are various reasons for the relatively poor agreement
among human annotators. First of all, the pragmatic status of
a negated sentence (matrix verb) might be unclear. As pre-
viously mentioned, if writer reports that C has not criticized
that COMP, then either C has intentionally not criticized it
or he was not aware of COMP at all. Only in the first case
(a reproach), we are allowed to infer attitudes of C towards
the participants of COMP. The second case is a plain denial..
This problem, however, depends on the verb. If the writer re-
ports that A has not managed (instead of criticize) to COMP,
then the denial reading is not valid, since “not to manage”
presupposes an attempt to do so. In this case, sentiment infer-
ences are licensed. This suggests that sometimes a pragmatic
decision has be taken (criticize) and sometimes the presence
of the verb is sufficient. Our current system has no means to
draw pragmatic inferences.
Also verb semantics beyond what we have captured via
our polar effects is crucial. In such cases, factuality alone
no longer might license a pro or a con relation. If A forces
B to help C, then it cannot be safely inferred that B is pro
C. The semantics of ”force” rather blocks positive or nega-
tive attitudes of the embedded participants (even if factuality
is given). However, polar effects are not blocked, C still is a
beneficiary.
Also common sense reasoning might contribute to attitude
prediction. If A is an unagreeable person (e.g. a terrorist) then
it no longer holds that if (such an) A supports B this should
count as a positive effect for B. That is, if B is con (such an) A
(like most people are) then an inference via the verb ”support”
that A is pro B produces a conflict that should prevent the
assertion of a positive effect on B. However, if it is the other
way round, e.g. that A is an agreeable person and A criticizes
B, where a negative effect should trigger, and given that B is
pro A, then the negative effect on B actually should occur (i.e.
the A con B relation does not produce any complications).
Our model is not fine-grained enough for these cases, at the
moment.
The inclination to assign polar effects in the presence of
negation seems to be gradual and dependent on the verb. If
A has not survived (some catastrophe), a negative effect on
A is uncontroversial, but if A has not won a bar of chocolate,
a negative effect is less likely to be annotated. Priming ef-
fects might have played a role in our annotation experiments
(negated survive followed by negated win).
From the sentence A fears that he misses the train a nega-
tive effect on A could be derived, although miss the train is
neither factual nor a very drastic catastrophe. The negative
effect could not come from “miss” since it is not factual, it
must come from “fear”. This is only possible if the polarity
frame of “fear” specifies a nfor role. However, in A fears that
B misses the train, a negative effect on A is harder to claim (it
is rather week, one could argue). Should A actually occupy a
nfor role of “fear” in this case? Or should this only be allowed
if the subject of fear and the subject of the embedded verb are
identical? Our current model does not make this distinction.
Cognitive complexity is another problem, e.g. massive
negation. Take A criticized that B has not convinced C not
to offend D. First of all, the verb“convince” is special, since
if both, convince and its subclause are negated, the subclause
event turns out to have happened. So D was offended. If we
replace “convince” through “help” (B has not helped C not
to offend D), D was not offended by anyone. This kind of
behaviour increases cognitive complexity and might be the
reason for wrong annotations. Our current rule component
is not yet able to cope with these special kinds of verbs (like
convince). In case of a double negation (in the context of such
a verb), a wrong prediction results, thus.
There are also a number of very specical cases that we can-
not help but to report. Take a real sentences from our corpus:
The strategic maneuver of the SP (a political party)to rec-
ommend Hollenstein in order to prevent Bortoluzzi, was suc-
cessful. One annotator claimed: con(Hollenstein, Bortoluzzi)
obviously on the grounds that they are rivials in a election,
but this rivalery is mediated only by a third party (the SP).
Given A approves that B lies. One annotator claimed a neg-
ative effect on B (since B is bound to do something immoral),
the other one a positive one (from approve). Our system as-
signs a pro relation (A pro B) and a nof relation, a negative
of-role (the annotators were instructed to ignore these cases
- actually, they are too rare in our corpus). Disagreement is
maximized in this case, we would say that the system’s infer-
ences are right.
In this section, we have tried to find the reasons for the
low agreement among human annotators. We have identified
a number of problems that also indicate that our rule compo-
nent needs to be refined. The current version is slightly be-
hind (the not very striking) human performance, one reason
for this is that our rules are (in part) not fine-grained enough.
In order to improve annotator agreement, we have to im-
prove the annotation guidelines. In order to improve system
performance, we have to refine our model.
9 Related Work
An early rule-based approach to sentiment inference is
[Neviarouskaya et al., 2009]. Each verb instantiation is de-
scribed from an internal and an external perspective. For ex-
ample, “to admire a mafia leader” is classified as affective
positive (the subject’s attitude towards the direct object) given
the internal perspective while it is (as a whole) negative ex-
ternally. Factuality and subclause embedding do not play any
role in their work. The same is true for [Reschke and Anand,
2011]. They capture the polarity of a verb frame instantiation
as a function of the polarity of the verb’s roles - we, instead,
do not know in advance, but intend to infer the (contextual)
polarity of the roles.
Recently, [Deng and Wiebe, 2014] and [Deng and Wiebe,
2015] have introduced an advanced conceptual framework for
inferring (sentiment) implicatures. Their work is most similar
to our approach. Various model versions exist, the most re-
cent one [Deng and Wiebe, 2015] also copes with event-level
sentiment inference, which brings it even closer to our model.
Probabilistic Soft Logic is used for the definition of the model
and for drawing inferences. The goal of the systems is to
detect pairs of entities that are in a PosPair or NegPair rela-
tion. This is similar to our pro and con relations. However, as
we mentioned before, factuality does not play a role in their
framework, while we believe it is crucial for some inferences.
10 Conclusion
We have introduced a novel model for the propagation of po-
lar effects (benefits, suffers) and attitude prediction (pro, con
relations). For the first time, factuality is regarded as cru-
cial in the context of attitude prediction. Our rule component
clearly indicates that factuality determination is needed in or-
der to properly draw these inferences.
Our empirical evaluation shows that the task at hand is not
trivial. The agreement among humans was far from being
perfect and - as a consequence - our system was hard to eval-
uate. The reasons can be found in the complexity of the task
- as we have shown in section 8. Most of the problems can be
solved within our choosen rule-based framework - this is fu-
ture work. But there is also a need to understand how humans
came to their decicisions and whether a more psychological
model of attitude predication was benefical.
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